IV. Footnotes

  1. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman: Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.): Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge, 1982, pages 3-20.
  2. Francis King and George Matthews (eds.): About Turn: The British Communist Party and the Second World War: the Verbatim Record of the Central Committee Meetings of 25 September and 2-3 October 1939, London. 1960.
  3. John Henry Newman: Apologia pro Vita Sua, London, 1978, page 239.
  4. Ludwig Wittgenstein: On Certainty, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, sections 83 and 103.
  5. Ibid. section 71.
  6. Ibid, section 108.
  7. Donald Davidson: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Donald Davidson: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford, 1984, page 189.
  8. Karl Popper: The Myth of the Framework, in Karl Popper: The Myth of the Framework, In Defence of Science and Rationality, edited by M.A. Notturno, London and New York, 1994, pages 33-64.
  9. Ibid, page 35.
  10. Bertrand Russell: On the Value of Scepticism, in Bertrand Russell: Sceptical Essays, London, 1928, page 11.
  11. Alvin Goldman: Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford, 1999.
  12. Allen Buchanan: Social Moral Epistemology, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2002; Allen Buchanan: Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2004.
  13. Hilary Putnam: Brains and Behaviour, in R.J. Butler (ed.): Analytical Philosophy, second series, Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, page 19.
  14. Susan A. Clancy: Abducted, How People Come to Believe They were Kidnapped by Aliens, Cambridge, Mass., 2005.
  15. Jerry Fodor: The Modularity of Mind, MIT, 1983.
  16. Richard Keshen: Reasonable but Intractable Disagreement, forthcoming.